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From Teams Impersonation to Edgecution

By Joshua Penny 19 November 2026 39 min read
This blog shares findings from a Bridewell investigation into Teams-based support impersonation and suspected Edgecution deployment, alongside Microsoft Defender for Endpoint hunting queries to help defenders identify similar activity in their environments.

On 22 October 2026, Bridewell investigated an unsolicited Microsoft Teams support message that led to malware execution on one customer endpoint. The customer operates in the US Energy sector. The subsequent activity included a fake system update, archive extraction into an Edge profile, Python archive staging and attempted removal of the downloaded executable. We assess with Moderate confidence that this sequence is consistent with the deployment workflow described in Zscaler's Edgecution reporting associated with an initial access broker linked to Payouts King.


Who is Payouts King?

Figure 1. Payouts King data-leak site and extortion messagin

Figure 1. Payouts King data-leak site and extortion messaging.

In April 2026, Zscaler reported activity consistent with former Black Basta initial access brokers, including spam bombing, Teams impersonation and Quick Assist abuse, and attributed some attacks to Payouts King with high confidence. Its June research described Edgecution deployment by a broker associated with the group.

The supplied Ransomware.live snapshot lists 117 Payouts King victim records across 11 countries, with an earliest estimated attack date of 17 April 2025 and a last-seen date of 24 October 2026. Its attack-velocity chart, which uses estimated attack dates where available, shows a concentration in January-April 2026, followed by lower monthly counts through October, with a smaller rise in August. These are records associated with the group's victim claims, rather than an independently confirmed count of attacks.

In the separately supplied sector snapshot, Manufacturing had the most classified victim claims (26), followed by Professional Services (11), Technology (10) and Healthcare (7); Energy & Utilities accounted for three. A further 41 records lacked a sector classification. The sector snapshot totals 113 records, so its figures are not treated as a complete breakdown of the 117-record group-profile snapshot.


Observed and assessed attack chain

Figure 2. Observed and assessed deployment sequence in the 22 October 2026 incident.

Figure 2. Observed and assessed deployment sequence in the 22 October 2026 incident.


From Fake IT Support to AutoHotkey Execution

The incident began when an external account Corp_Engineer@ComputerHub788.onmicrosoft.com approached two users through Microsoft Teams using an IT-support-style identity. One user engaged and subsequently executed malware on one endpoint.

Command line
"msedge.exe" --edge-skip-compat-layer-relaunch --single-argument microsoft-edge:///?url=https%3a%2f%2fms-service-page-95217-32861-09791.s3.amazonaws[.]com%2fadmin.html&source=teams
Command line
"msedge.exe" --single-argument microsoft-edge:///?url=https%3a%2f%2fms-service-page-95217-32861-09791.s3.amazonaws[.]com%2fadmin.html&source=teams.html&source=teams

S3 lure launch

KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("msedge.exe", "ms-teams.exe")
| extend DecodedCommandLine = url_decode(ProcessCommandLine)
| extend LaunchUrl = extract(@"(?i)(https?://[^\s""<>]+)", 1, DecodedCommandLine)
| where LaunchUrl contains "ms-service-page"
| where LaunchUrl endswith "admin.html&source=teams"
| project
    Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, ReportId, AccountName,
    FileName, ProcessCommandLine, LaunchUrl, ProcessId,
    InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine

Process telemetry records kb170013527.exe executing from the user's Downloads directory, with msedge.exe as its initiating process. We identified it as a legitimate AutoHotkey executable renamed to kb170013527.exe to resemble a system update. Its version metadata identifies AutoHotkey 2.0.26 (AutoHotkey 64-bit). This places the executable's launch after the Teams lure and browser activity. No embedded script was identified in the executable, and no associated AutoHotkey script was recovered or identified.

Network telemetry records the executable generating a TCP/443 event to the same S3 hostname used by the lure page before the extraction commands. We assess with Moderate confidence that this AutoHotkey-based executable likely retrieved the outer ZIP payload from the S3 delivery infrastructure before launching tar.exe to extract it. The requested filename and transferred content were not visible in the network event.

AutoHotkey executable contacting S3 delivery infrastructure

KQL
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName has "AutoHotkey"
| where RemoteUrl endswith "s3.amazonaws.com"
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath matches regex @"(?i)\\downloads\\kb[^\\]*\.exe$"
| project
    Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, ReportId, ActionType,
    InitiatingProcessAccountName,
    InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath,
    InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessId,
    InitiatingProcessCreationTime,
    InitiatingProcessParentFileName,
    InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName,
    InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion,
    InitiatingProcessSHA1, InitiatingProcessSHA256,
    RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Protocol
| order by Timestamp desc

The available evidence supports an AutoHotkey-based deployment route. Clipboard-based batch or PowerShell deployment, also described by Zscaler, was not established in this incident.

Edge AppKey writes

KQL
DeviceRegistryEvents
| where ActionType == "RegistryValueSet"
| where RegistryKey endswith @"\Software\Microsoft\Edge"
| where RegistryValueName =~ "AppKey"
| project
    Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, ReportId,
    RegistryKey, RegistryValueName, RegistryValueType,
    RegistryValueData, PreviousRegistryValueData,
    InitiatingProcessAccountName,
    InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

Native-messaging registration

KQL
DeviceRegistryEvents
| where ActionType == "RegistryValueSet"
| where RegistryKey contains @"\Microsoft\Edge\NativeMessagingHosts\"
    or RegistryKey contains @"\Google\Chrome\NativeMessagingHosts\"
| project
    Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, ReportId,
    RegistryKey, RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData,
    InitiatingProcessAccountName,
    InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc


Scheduled-task persistence and headless Edge

Zscaler describes a scheduled task launching Edge in headless mode with the malicious extension and a separate Recovery profile.

Headless Edge with an extension

KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName =~ "msedge.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has_all ("--load-extension", "--headless", "--user-data-dir")
| where ProcessCommandLine contains @"\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Recovery"

Scheduled-task extension launch

KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FileName =~ "schtasks.exe"
    and (ProcessCommandLine contains "/create"
        or ProcessCommandLine contains "/change"))
    or (FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe")
    and (ProcessCommandLine contains "Register-ScheduledTask"
        or ProcessCommandLine contains "Set-ScheduledTask"))
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "msedge"
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "--load-extension"
| project
    Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, ReportId,
    AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
    InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc


Native-host execution and command and control

Zscaler's Edgecution reporting describes a backdoor architecture in which a headless Edge extension communicates over WebSockets and relays commands to Python through native messaging. The queries below look for the Edge-to-command-shell-to-Python process chain, Python-launched shells and WebSocket C2 candidates.

Edge-to-Python Native-Host Execution

KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName in~ ("python.exe", "pythonw.exe")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "cmd.exe"
| where InitiatingProcessParentFileName =~ "msedge.exe"
| extend
    HasNativeHostLauncher = InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "native_host.bat",
    HasEdgeProfileScript = ProcessCommandLine contains @"\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\"
| project
    Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, ReportId, AccountName,
    FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine,
    HasNativeHostLauncher, HasEdgeProfileScript,
    ProcessId, ProcessCreationTime,
    InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
    InitiatingProcessParentFileName
| order by Timestamp desc

Python shell execution

KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("python.exe", "pythonw.exe")
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains @"\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\"
    or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "native_host.py"
| project
    Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, ReportId, AccountName,
    FileName, ProcessCommandLine, ProcessId, ProcessCreationTime,
    InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath,
    InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessId,
    InitiatingProcessCreationTime
| order by Timestamp desc

Edgecution C2 candidates

KQL
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteUrl has "cloudfront.net"
    and RemoteUrl has "/ws"
    and (RemoteUrl startswith "wss://"
        or RemoteUrl contains "wss%3A%2F%2F")
| project
    Timestamp,
    DeviceId,
    DeviceName,
    ReportId,
    InitiatingProcessAccountName,
    InitiatingProcessFileName,
    InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
    RemoteUrl,
    RemoteIP,
    RemotePort,
    ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc


Into the Edge profile

Process telemetry confirms that kb170013527.exe initiated both tar.exe commands. The first attempts to extract wfbwrvtetx.zip into this directory beneath the user's Edge profile:

Staging path
%LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\WorkspacesNavigation\TrustProtectExtension

Tar.exe archive extraction

KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName =~ "tar.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine contains " -xf "
| where ProcessCommandLine contains @"\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\WorkspacesNavigation\TrustProtectExtension"
| where ProcessCommandLine contains " -C "
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "--passphrase"
| project
    Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, ReportId, AccountName,
    FileName, ProcessCommandLine, ProcessId,
    InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine

The same executable then initiates a second tar.exe command, this time referencing a.zip within the extension staging tree and the extraction destination C:\ProgramData\python-3.14.7. The path name does not verify the installed runtime version or establish Python execution.

Python archive staging

KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName =~ "tar.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine contains " -xf "
| where ProcessCommandLine contains @"\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\WorkspacesNavigation\TrustProtectExtension\a.zip"
| where ProcessCommandLine contains " -C "
| where ProcessCommandLine contains @"C:\ProgramData\python-"
| project
    Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, ReportId, AccountName,
    FileName, ProcessCommandLine, ProcessId,
    InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine

A FileRenamed event records kb170013527.exe renaming kfjkdveha.wzy to native_host.py within the extension staging directory. The resulting path was:

Resulting path
%LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\WorkspacesNavigation\TrustProtectExtension\qyyrob\native_host.py


The Python component: a backdoor on the host

The significance of native_host.py is its assessed role as the host-side backdoor component. In Zscaler's report, the Edge extension communicates with the remote operator and forwards host commands to Python through native messaging. A setup-created native_host.bat launcher starts the Python backdoor, which exchanges requests and results with the extension over standard input and output. This gives the operator a route from the browser extension to operating-system actions.

The reported Python backdoor supports collecting system information, listing processes, writing files and executing shell commands, Python code and PowerShell. Zscaler describes an obfuscated Python script packaged within the encrypted deployment archive, alongside the extension and Python runtime; an AppKey registry value supplies its string-decryption key. These are reported capabilities, rather than actions established in our incident.

We assess with Moderate confidence that the archive supplied kfjkdveha.wzy within TrustProtectExtension, after which the renamed AutoHotkey executable changed it to native_host.py. The separate a.zip command targets the ProgramData Python directory. No subsequent backdoor execution or C2 communication was established.

Edge Native-Messaging Host File Staging

KQL
DeviceFileEvents
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated", "FileModified", "FileRenamed")
| where FolderPath contains @"\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\"
| where
    FileName =~ "native_host.bat"
    or FileName =~ "native_host.py"
    or (
        FolderPath contains @"\native"
        and (
            FileName endswith ".json"
            or FileName endswith ".py"
            or FileName endswith ".bat"
        )
    )
| project
    Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, ReportId,
    ActionType, FileName, FolderPath, SHA1,
    InitiatingProcessAccountName,
    InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

Finally, the executable invoked a command combining a short delay with forced, quiet deletion of files matching Downloads\kb170013527*. The command records an attempted cleanup action; it does not establish that deletion succeeded.

Command line
cmd /c start /min "" cmd /c timeout 4 & del /F /Q "C:\Users\ [redacted] \Downloads\kb170013527*" 2>nul & exit /b

Delayed Cleanup of KB-Named Executables in Downloads

KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName has "cmd.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "timeout 4 & del"
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)\\Downloads\\kb[0-9]+\*"
| project Timestamp, FileName, ProcessCommandLine


How our incident aligns with Edgecution

Zscaler describes Teams impersonation leading to a fake update site with AutoHotkey and clipboard-script deployment options. An encrypted ZIP with altered header bytes holds an embedded Python distribution, an extension and a native component. The setup repairs and extracts the archive, configures native messaging and schedules headless Edge. This supports the broad deployment comparison. In our incident, a renamed legitimate AutoHotkey executable was identified, but the associated script was not recovered.

In particular, Zscaler's example uses a test1 staging directory and Python 3.13.3; this incident references TrustProtectExtension and a separate a.zip extraction to a Python-named ProgramData directory.

The overlap in this case rests on the support impersonation, AutoHotkey metadata, S3 delivery-infrastructure activity, Edge-profile staging, Python archive preparation and dropped native-host component. Those similarities support the Moderate-confidence assessment that the incident is consistent with the reported workflow. Scheduled-task creation, headless Edge execution, AppKey writes, successful C2 communication and Python command execution were not established in the incident.


Hunting for additional reported stages

The following stages were reported by Zscaler but were not established in our incident. We include corresponding hunt queries to help defenders investigate whether similar deployments progressed beyond the staging activity observed here. These queries cover AppKey configuration, native-messaging registration, extension persistence, native-host execution, Python-launched shells and C2 candidates.

Configuration and native-messaging registration

The reported deployment also includes archive preparation, an AppKey value under HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Edge and native-host configuration. See Zscaler's Edgecution analysis.


Infrastructure tracking adds context

Bridewell observed a recurring S3 bucket-name pattern:

ms-service-page-<five digits>-<five digits>-<five digits>

This pattern offers an infrastructure-discovery lead alongside endpoint investigation. The following 12 hostnames match the delivery naming pattern:

Domain
ms-service-page-11543-17831-11139.s3.amazonaws[.]com
ms-service-page-95217-32861-09791.s3.amazonaws[.]com
ms-service-page-75850-45485-20762.s3.us-east-1.amazonaws[.]com
ms-service-page-75850-45485-20762.s3.amazonaws[.]com
ms-service-page-05026-07997-95929.s3.amazonaws[.]com
ms-service-page-27446-81109-06346.s3.amazonaws[.]com
ms-service-page-32986-68367-25555.s3.amazonaws[.]com
ms-service-page-32877-97846-87437.s3.amazonaws[.]com
ms-service-page-02812-32002-28599.s3.amazonaws[.]com
ms-service-page-37166-13109-87410.s3.amazonaws[.]com
ms-service-page-80767-01412-22218.s3.amazonaws[.]com
ms-service-page-56617-86972-21652.s3.amazonaws[.]com


Python backdoor SHA-256 indicators

The following hashes are provided for retrospective hunting. The first is listed as a Python backdoor in Zscaler's Edgecution research; the remaining three were identified by Bridewell as Python backdoor indicators.

SHA-256 Source / context
3d1158884fb339b3328bd330fcc27598e1f1c94bcac39e75d1a272afa4deee1a Zscaler-reported Edgecution Python backdoor.
eaee8a8092a779dd68d7f411cee48212c61f325ceb9ad145107a9c0b4ca74b3b Analyst-supplied Python backdoor indicator; not independently verified.
ad233fa4a6e64818b6d1d1bc537efd40c3d1c9b20cc3c0954981071c6048723d Analyst-supplied Python backdoor indicator; not independently verified.
65f710a78986a79802da98425d4df4c02859949505fbb5a8490da36aad7a5edd Analyst-supplied Python backdoor indicator; not independently verified.


Practical defensive priorities

The first opportunity is to interrupt the support pretext. Give users a trusted route to verify unsolicited IT requests, and review how external accounts can contact staff through Teams. A patch request received in chat should be checked against established support and software-distribution processes.

On endpoints, review policy for unapproved browser extensions and interpreters. Investigators should examine extension staging in user-writable directories, native-messaging manifests and registration, and scheduled-task actions that launch Edge with unusual extension arguments.

Network investigation should combine precise reported destinations with process context and available WebSocket visibility.

The most useful lesson from this incident is the connection between the social interaction and the endpoint artifacts. Following an apparent update into an Edge profile exposed a deployment pattern that warranted investigation across browser configuration, Python staging and native messaging. That gives defenders concrete places to look while keeping the case's confirmed observations separate from the wider backdoor capabilities.


 

How Bridewell can help

Bridewell's Cyber Threat Intelligence services help organisations turn threat research into practical detection and security decisions. Our team provides threat hunting, intrusion analysis and intelligence-led detection support, alongside monitoring for exposed credentials, dark-web activity and third-party threats. We work with your SOC to prioritise intelligence relevant to your organisation and develop hunting hypotheses and custom detection analytics.

To discuss how we can support your team, explore our Cyber Threat Intelligence services and speak to our experts.


 

MITRE ATT&CK mapping

The incident tables distinguish observations from assessed activity; the final table maps additional behaviours described by Zscaler.

TechniqueBehaviourEvidence basis
T1566.003 - Spearphishing via Service External Teams messages impersonating IT support.Observed incident activity.
T1204.002 - Malicious File User-assisted launch of the fake-update deployment executable.Incident account and execution telemetry; the legitimate interpreter was used in the malicious workflow.
T1140 - Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Password-protected payload archive unpacking into the Edge profile.Extraction command observed; successful extraction is not independently established by the command alone.
T1059.003 - Windows Command Shell cmd.exe invoked for delayed cleanup.Process invocation observed; successful deletion not established.
T1070.004 - File Deletion Delayed deletion command targeting KB-named Downloads files.Attempt observed; successful deletion not established.

Assessed technique in our incident

TechniqueBehaviourEvidence basis
T1105 - Ingress Tool Transfer Assessed retrieval of the outer ZIP by the AutoHotkey executable.Moderate-confidence assessment from S3 network activity preceding extraction; transferred content was not visible.

Additional techniques mapped from Zscaler's reporting

We checked the Edgecution article: it describes the behaviours below but does not explicitly list these ATT&CK IDs. The mappings are ours, not a technique list published by Zscaler. These stages or capabilities were not established in our incident.

Our ATT&CK mappingSupporting behaviour in the articleArticle section
T1112 - Modify RegistrySetup writes the AppKey registry value.Initial access & malware deployment
T1053.005 - Scheduled TaskTask launches headless Edge.Initial access & malware deployment
T1176.001 - Browser ExtensionsMalicious extension loaded by the scheduled launch.Initial access & malware deployment
T1071.001 - Web ProtocolsWebSocket C2.Edgecution browser extension
T1059.003 - Windows Command ShellBatch deployment, batch launcher and shell-command capability.Deployment; command ID 107
T1059.006 - PythonPython backdoor and Python-code execution.Deployment; command ID 109
T1059.001 - PowerShellPowerShell deployment and command capability.Deployment; command ID 111
T1082 - System Information DiscoverySystem-information collection capability.Command ID 106
T1057 - Process DiscoveryProcess-listing capability.Command ID 110
The article also describes archive unpacking and C2-configuration deletion, supporting T1140 and T1070.004 respectively. Those IDs already appear in our incident table, where they refer to the observed archive-extraction and download-cleanup commands, not confirmed execution of the vendor's full chain.

References

SourceContribution
Zscaler: Edgecution, cited as 23 June 2026 Reported deployment workflow, backdoor architecture and broker association.
Zscaler: Payouts King ransomware, cited as 16 April 2026 Separate ransomware analysis and historical context.
Ransomware.live: Payouts King, supplied screenshots; capture dates unspecified Profile total, geographic reach, displayed date range, qualitative monthly pattern and separate sector counts; differing totals remain unreconciled.

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Joshua-Penny (2)

Joshua Penny

Senior Threat Intelligence Analyst

Joshua Penny is a Senior Threat Intelligence Analyst with 5 years’ experience working within C...
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