UK CNI Infostealer Threat Report - Q3 2026 banner image
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BCON COLLECTIVE

UK CNI Infostealer Threat Insights

By Daniel Whitcombe 16 October 2026 15 min read
Live analysis of credential theft malware targeting UK Critical National Infrastructure pulled directly from the Ransomware.Live PRO API and enriched with HudsonRock infostealer intelligence by BCON Collective for the period selected above.

Sources: api-pro.ransomware.live + hudsonrock.com · Period: Q3 2026 · 9 victims analysed


Key Findings

01

9 UK CNI victims recorded
In Q3 2026

9 UK Critical National Infrastructure organisations carried confirmed infostealer telemetry, spanning 18 distinct stealer families across 5 CNI sectors - averaging 3 per month across the quarter..

02

Generic Stealer leads detections

Generic Stealer was the most prevalent stealer family, generating 6,487 credential-set detections - 32.2% of all detections this period.

03

33.3% of victims have a named family

3 of 9 UK CNI victims (33.3%) had a specific stealer family attributed by Ransomware.Live. The remainder have confirmed infostealer exposure, which is reported as Unknown Stealer as there is not a published family breakdown.

04

Manufacturing hardest-hit sector

Manufacturing was the most targeted CNI sector, accounting for 33.3% of all victims. Thegentlemen was the most active threat actor, linked to 3 victims.


Quarter Snapshot

9
Total Victims

This quarter

20K
Detections

Credential sets

Generic Stealer
Top Stealer

32.2% of detections

5
CNI Sectors

Sectors affected

18
Stealer Families

Active this period

Thegentlemen
Most Active Group

3 victim

 

BACKGROUND

WHAT IS AN INFOSTEALER?

An infostealer is a type of malware built to quietly harvest sensitive data from an infected device rather than encrypt or destroy anything. Once installed - typically via cracked software, fake installers, malicious adverts, or phishing attachments - it scrapes browser-saved passwords, active session cookies, autofill data, cryptocurrency wallets, and VPN or RDP configuration files, then sends everything back to the attacker in a single package known as a "log".

These logs circulate rapidly through criminal forums and private channels, often reaching ransomware affiliates within days of infection. A log containing valid VPN or remote-desktop credentials for a target organisation can provide ready-made network access, skipping the phishing and exploitation stages entirely. BCON Collective monitors these channels continuously - the credential theft frequently happens weeks or months before the ransomware payload is deployed, making infostealer exposure one of the most actionable early warning signals available.

Well-known families referenced throughout this report - RedLine, Lumma, Raccoon, StealC, and Vidar among them - are typically operated as Malware-as-a-Service, lowering the barrier to entry for criminal actors and accelerating deployment. BCON Collective tracks active stealer families and their infrastructure as part of our managed threat intelligence service.

WHAT'S BEING COUNTED:

Every figure in this report reflects only victims with confirmed, non-zero infostealer exposure. Records with no infostealer data - or where every field is empty/zero - are excluded entirely. Confirmed exposure without a named stealer family is reported as "Unknown Stealer" rather than dropped.


QUATER-ON-QUATER

LONGER-TERM TRAJECTORY

This view complements the current-quarter analysis by showing how infostealer-linked victim volume and detection counts have moved across recent quarters - separating short-term noise from the broader directional trend.

Quarter-on-quarter trend, Q2 2025 to Q3 2026

 

Across the 6-quarter window ending Q3 2026, infostealer-linked victim postings show an upward trajectory, going from 5 in Q2 2025 to 9 currently - This is a +50% above the rolling baseline average of 6victims. In the most recent quarter, postings fell by 10% quarter-on-quarter, while detections rose +1387% to 20K. The peak in this window was 10 victims in Q2 2026.

Month-over-Month

What changed within the Quarter

Monthly breakdown, Q3 2026

Between July and September, infostealer-linked victim postings increased from (2 to 4). The number of active stealer families grew from 2 to 18, suggesting broader tooling diversity.


EMERGING THREATS

New and Rising Stealer Families

 

This analysis highlights malware families that appeared for the first time this quarter, experienced sharp month-on-month growth, or saw a significant decline in activity after being active in previous months. Tracking these three indicators helps identify emerging threats early and recognise families that may be falling out of use. “Unknown Stealer” is excluded because it has no confirmed family attribution.

New & rising families this period


    SECTOR ANALYSIS

    CNI Sector Breakdown

    Ranked view of which Critical National Infrastructure sectors were hit hardest by infostealer-linked ransomware in the selected period.

    Figure 4 - UK CNI victims by sector

     

    Manufacturing was the hardest-hit CNI sector in this period, accounting for 33% of all UK CNI victims. Victims spanned across five of the NCSC's Critical National Infrastructure sectors; the top three sectors collectively represented 78% of all activity.


     

    MARKET STRUCTURE

    Stealer Family Concentration

    How much of total detection volume is held by a small number of dominant families. A higher concentration means defenders can focus detection engineering on fewer, better-understood threats.

    Figure 5 - Concentration of detections among top families


    MALWARE ANALYSIS

    Top Infostealer Families

    Among UK CNI victims, chart reflects which stealer families were confirmed for the period and filters selected above.

    Figure 6 - Detection Volume by Family


    UK LANDSCAPE

    UK Ransomeware & Infostealer Activity

    Monthly UK victim trends and the sectors most frequently targeted, based on victims with confirmed infostealer telemetry in the selected period.

     

    Figure 7 - Monthly UK Victim Count

    Figure 8 - Sectors Targeted


    THREAT INTELLIGENCE

    Top Threat Actors

    Groups ranked by number of victims with confirmed infostealer data attached to their incident record.

    Figure 9 - Groups by Victim Count

    GLOBAL BENCHMARK

    RANSOMWARE GROUPS BY INFOSTEALER ADOPTION

    Which ransomware groups rely most heavily on infostealer credentials as part of their playbook - measured as the share of a group's entire global victim base (every country, every sector) that carries confirmed infostealer data. This is deliberately not limited to UK CNI, since a meaningful adoption rate needs a much larger sample than the UK-only figures elsewhere in this report can provide.

    Figure 10 - Top ransomware groups by % of victims with infostealer data

    CREDENTIAL EXPOSURE

    Scale of Credential Damage

    Credentials exposed across victims with infostealer data, broken down by employee, consumer, and third-party accounts.

    Figure 11 - Credential Type Distribution

     

    Figure 12 - Credential Exposure Trend by Month

    VICTIM DETAIL

    UK CNI VICTIM RECORDS

    Individual incidents affecting UK organisations within - or adjacent to - the NCSC's Critical National Infrastructure sectors: telecoms, healthcare, financial services, transport, energy, government, manufacturing, agriculture & food, water, defence, chemicals, and emergency services. Adjust the filters above to narrow further.

    This report - and every figure throughout it - counts only victims with confirmed, non-zero infostealer exposure. Records with no infostealer data, or where every field (employee/consumer/third-party credentials and per-family detections) is empty or zero, are excluded entirely rather than treated as a data point. Where exposure is confirmed but Ransomware.Live hasn't published which stealer family was responsible, that victim is labelled "Unknown Stealer" rather than dropped.

    Victims with confirmed, non-zero infostealer exposure.

     

    Showing 9 of 9 UK CNI victims - 3 include a published per-family detection breakdown (Detected); the remaining 6 have confirmed credential exposure but no named stealer family published, shown here as "Unknown Stealer" (Partial). Records with no infostealer signal at all, or with every field empty/zero, are excluded entirely.


     

    CREDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE

    TOP STOLEN CREDENTIALS

    Cross-references domains extracted from the UK CNI victims above against Bridewell's infostealer intelligence sources - reporting only the third-party services most often found alongside stolen corporate access in the same logs. Bridewell's credential monitoring capability surfaces this exposure continuously, not only at report time.

    Figure 13 -Top Compromised Third-Party Services

    DEFENSIVE GUIDANCE

    RECOMMENTATIONS FOR UK CNI ORGANISATIONS 

    Treat infostealer evidence as an independent threat, not just a precursor to ransomware. Credential theft often happens weeks or months before the destructive event - organised here across the full lifecycle: stopping infections before they happen, catching the ones that get through, and reacting fast when stolen credentials are confirmed.

    PREVENT
    • Enforce Phishing-Resistant MFA: Replace TOTP/SMS codes with FIDO2/WebAuthn hardware keys on all privileged and remote-access accounts. Modern infostealer families specifically target session cookies and authenticator codes stored on disk - hardware-bound keys eliminate this attack path entirely. Bridewell can assess your current MFA posture and identify gaps across your estate.

    • Harden Endpoint & Browser Credential Storage: Disable browser-saved passwords for privileged accounts, enforce application allowlisting, and block script and executable launches from user-writable folders such as Downloads and Temp - the most common infostealer execution paths. Bridewell's endpoint hardening assessments identify these exposure points across your environment.

    • Target Awareness Training at Infostealer Delivery Vectors: Most infostealer infections originate from cracked software, fake installers, or malvertising rather than traditional phishing. Awareness programmes should explicitly cover these vectors, not just email-based attacks.

    DETECT
    • Maintain Continuous Infostealer Log Monitoring: Bridewell's credential monitoring service continuously tracks infostealer logs and dark web sources for exposure of your organisation's domains and credentials - surfacing alerts before ransomware actors can exploit what's been stolen. The window between credential theft and active exploitation is typically days to weeks, making continuous monitoring - not periodic checks - the only effective posture.

    • Tune EDR for Stealer-Specific Behaviours: Configure EDR detections for LSASS memory access, bulk browser credential-store reads, and clipboard hijacking rather than relying on signature-based antivirus, which most current stealer families evade. Bridewell's managed detection and response (MDR) service includes pre-tuned detection rules for infostealer-specific behaviours across your endpoint estate.

    • Monitor for Anomalous Authentication: Watch for impossible-travel logins, new-device authentication paired with an existing session token, and access patterns inconsistent with a user's normal behaviour - all indicators of stolen-credential reuse. Bridewell's SOC monitors these signals around the clock, correlating authentication telemetry with our threat intelligence feeds to distinguish credential reuse from legitimate access.

    RESPOND
    • Rotate Credentials and Invalidate Sessions Immediately: On any confirmed infostealer log match, rotate the affected credentials and invalidate all active sessions the same day - don't wait for a scheduled password-rotation cycle. Stolen session cookies remain usable until explicitly revoked.

    • Run an Infostealer-Specific IR Playbook: Treat a confirmed infostealer match as an active incident, not routine hygiene: scope which systems and accounts were exposed, check for lateral movement, and assume the credentials may already be in active use. Bridewell's incident response team has direct experience handling infostealer-linked intrusions and can support triage, containment, and recovery.

    • Coordinate Third-Party Notification: Third-party credentials make up a large share of total exposure. When a supplier's credentials appear in a log tied to your organisation, notify them promptly and confirm their own remediation before restoring access. Bridewell's CTI team can monitor third-party exposure continuously - alerting you when supplier credentials surface in infostealer logs before they're exploited against your supply chain.

     

    Discover how BCON Collective helps organisations identify, monitor and respond to emerging cyber threats.
    CTI Analyst

    Daniel Whitcombe

    CTI Analyst

    Daniel Whitcombe is a Threat Intelligence Analyst working within CTI at Bridewell and has prev... Daniel Whitcombe is a Threat Intelligence Analyst working within CTI at Bridewell and has previous experience within the Financial Sector.
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